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As the numbers on party identification alluded to, the electoral competition for 
governmental power in Portugal has focused almost exclusively on the Left-leaning PS and the 
Right-leaning PSD over the last 10 years.  The election results in Table 6 show that in the last 
three legislative elections, 1991, 1995, and 1999 the combined vote of the PS and PSD totaled 
approximately 80%.  From 1975 through 1987, these two parties won as little as 52 and never 
more than 76%.  Even then, their highest combined vote percentages came when the PS was in an 
electoral alliance with two smaller parties (UEDS and ASDI, in 1980) and when the PSD was 
aligned electorally with CDS, PPM, and Reformists (the AD alliance in 1979 and 1980).  Up until 
1987, the Communists were receiving between 12 and 20% of the vote while the CDS/PP and 
other small parties to the Right of the PSD were receiving between 10 and 17% of the vote. 
These vote percentages tell a common tale of partisan competition during a nation’s first 
generation of democratic governance.  The first 12 years of the Democracia exhibit a pattern of 
variable party competition similar to that seen in other emerging democratic systems and, for that 
matter, in re-established regimes throughout Europe after World War II (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 87-88).  New and revamped systems tend to experience an early period of erratic, uncertain 
competition as ambitious politicians experiment to see what strategies will work.  With 
experience as a teacher, the more as well as less successful politicians and organisations 
reconsider and re-strategize.  The result, often, is to bring clarity to the nature of the competition.  
That is, through the early years of the process one learns who is vying for governmental power, 
who might be a pivot party for government formation, and who is positioning to keep their policy 
or ideological voice heard.  Thereafter, electoral competition settles into a relatively more 
predictable pattern. 
The right hand column of Table 1 records the effective number of Portuguese parties, 
according to both their votes and seats.1  From 1975 to 1987, the Portuguese party system had, 
effectively, from three to five electoral parties and from two-and-a-half to four parliamentary 
                                                     
1 Political scientists have come to rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, originally 
developed in economics to describe concentrations in foreign trade (Hirschman 1945), to describe the 
effective number of parties in a system (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979).  The formula weights the system-
wide vote or seat proportions received by the parties to describe the system at large.  In a formula, the 
effective number of parties (Neff) is: 
(Neff)  =  1 / Σ pi2 , 
where pi
2 is the proportion of votes (to produce NVeff) or seats  (to produce NSeff), received by party i, and 




parties.  Since 1987, the Portuguese party system has been effectively a three-party system in the 
electorate and a two-and-a-half party system in the legislature. 
[Table 1 about here] 
By standards set by mechanical effects of electoral rules, Portugal’s party system at the 
end of Democracia’s first generation has to be considered small. With an assembly size of 230, 
20 districts, no legal threshold, and a within-district-only d’Hondt allocation rule, Portugal’s 
effective district magnitude is 11.5—i.e., the average number of seats per electoral district as 
adjusted for compensatory/additional seat allocations and for legal thresholds of inclusion (see 
Lijphart 1994, 25-9).  Alone, that sort of effective district magnitude produces an expected 3.8 
effective parties, something on the order of what one might find in Norway or Sweden 
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 135-41).2  But that is not what in fact occurs. During the 1990s, the 
two-and-a-half to three party system makes Portugal´s party system look similar to either 
Ireland´s party system, with its small district magnitudes and with its single-transferable vote rule 
(STV), or Germany´s system, with its high legal threshold and two-tier compensatory allocation.   
Three pressures operate to hold down the effective number of Portuguese parties.  One is 
Portugal’s semi-presidential system.  Another is a relatively small number of issue dimensions 
that crosscut the Portuguese society.  The third is a rather remarkably high breakeven point in the 
proportionate translation of vote to seat percentages, which is a consequence of an electoral bias 




The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic awards the President substantial power 
within the norms of a parliamentary system, as we have discussed.    According to Matthew 
Shugart and John Carey (Shugart and Carey 1992; see also, Lijphart 1994, 130-4), such a 
powerfully endowed and popularly elected individual will tend to focus the electoral energies of 
parties and thereby exert pressure to  reduce the number of effective parties. 
 The Constitution states that the President represents the entire Republic and holds 
responsibility for the independence and unity of the state (Article 120).  Under that mandate, the 
Constitution does not anticipate that presidential candidates will be advocates for partisan policy 
positions.  Indeed, presidential nominations come through petitions signed by a requisite number 
                                                     
2 Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 144) suggest that an approximate description for translating effective 
district magnitude into an effective number of electoral parties (NVeff) is:  
(NVeff) =  1.25 (2 +  log 10Meff). 
  
  
of citizens and submitted to the Constitutional Court (Article 124).  With substantial power at 
stake and with one of the well-served functions of political parties being the organisation of an 
electorate, the Portuguese parties have found a way find a way into the presidential electoral 
process.  Typically, persons announce their intentions to be presidential candidates; thereafter the 
parties meet formally and express their preference or support for one of the announced 
candidates.   
The results of Portugal’s six presidential elections are reported in Table 2.  Overall, there 
is a tendency of parties to coalesce in one of two patterns that, in the end, has led to the election 
of a Left/Centre-leaning President. At times a Centre coalition of the PS and PSD formed—1976 
and 1981.  At other times, Left-leaning versus Right-leaning coalitions have formed—1980, the 
1986 runoff, and 1996.  One clear consequence is that the candidate supported  by the Socialists 
has won all six elections.  Another consequence is that presidential elections do appear to exert 
pressure to a reduced number of parties.  Except for 1986, the effective number of parties is in the 
vicinity of 2.0.  Interestingly, the 1986 election provides a particularly good illustration of 
pressure toward a small effective party system but also provides a strong qualification to the 
tendency. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In the 1985, supporters of President Eanes launched a new party, the PRD, which staked 
out a position between the PS and the PCP.  The infighting among Socialists had its roots in 
disputes between Eanes and Soares that could be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s.  With 
Eanes constitutionally unable to succeed himself, having served two presidential terms, his 
supporters laid the foundation for a new party in the preceding 1985 Assembly elections.  They 
argued that the PS had lost its compass on the path toward a democratic socialist society.  The 
PRD proved a serious detriment to the electoral appeal of the PS for Assembly seats.  It won over 
18% of the vote and nearly the same percentage of seats; the PS received its lowest vote 
percentage, 21.4, during the Democracia period.  During the following presidential election, the 
PRD and Eanes himself supported Francisco Salgado Zenha, a founding member of the renewed-
PS shortly after the Revolution, who had sided with President Eanes when he took issue with 
Soares during the late-70’s and early-80s.  The presidential result was a three-way split of the 
vote on the left among Soares (PS, 25.4%), Zenha (PRD and PCP, 20.9%), and Lourdes 
Pintasilgo (UDP, 7.4%)—see Table 2.  Soares finished second, ahead of Zenha; and while he was 
a distant second, it was enough to get him into a runoff with Freitas do Amaral.  Seen in the light 
focused on events leading to Eanes successor, it appears that an ideological dispute resulting  
                                                                                                                                                              
For an effective district magnitude of 11.5, the expected value of Nv is 3.83. 
  
  
from  personalities of the candidates seeking power through the presidential office could come 
together to fractionalise the parties. 
The pressure for electoral coalitions was clearly evident during the presidential runoff.  
Freitas do Amaral, a former student of Marcelo Caetano´s pre-Revolution government and a 
founder of the decidedly Right-of-Centre, CDS/PP, had finished first in the first-round election.  
To some observers he appeared to be a shoe-in in the runoff.  During the three weeks between the 
elections, however, the PRD, PCP, and UDP stood behind Soares.  When the PCP convened in an 
extraordinary session in early February, the party secretary, Álvaro Cunhal, said: “If it upsets you 
to vote for him [Soares, former PS leader], shut your eyes.  Ignore the name and photo.  Just put a 
cross in the box next to them on the ballot paper” (quoted in Keesing’s 1986, 34313).  With the 
PRD, PCP and UDP support, Soares eked out a victory.  The seemingly ideological dogmatism 
on the Left appears to have had its limits. 
The presidential results suggest that the electoral basis of this office does indeed have a 
constricting on the party system, with a focus on the Centre.  They also offer evidence of a 
caution not to overstate that tendency.  The presidential office could prove fertile ground for 
launching a new party given the appropriate candidate with who can claim to be filling an 
ideological void.  Still, typically, there are in the neighborhood of just over two effective parties 
at the presidential level.  Viewed in conjunction with the legislative election results reported 
above, Table 1, one has the impression of a “stretched” two-party system.  The major parties are 
in the Centre, one leaning a little to the Left and the other to the Right, and each of the major 
parties has its extremist on its wings.  The wings stand on their own principles to the extent that 
prudence permits.  At those times when electoral success and, with it, the pursuit of governing 




 A second restricting influence on the number of effective parties is that of issue 
cleavages. The few salient issue cleavages that exist among the Portuguese people and parties do 
not create much need nor leave much room for the development of a large number of parties.  
This, too, can be expected to reduce the number of parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 
1984; 1999; Taagepera and Grofman 1985).  
In the early 90s at the request of Michael Laver and Ben Hunt, a few experts weighed in 
and pronounced themselves on the issue positions of the parties in 16 Western democracies, 
among them the Portuguese parties (Laver and Hunt 1992). From the expert assessments, Laver 
  
  
and Hunt were among the first to provide the results of a survey of expert opinions on where the 
parties stand on eight particular issues and how important these issues are to the them. 
Table 3 reports the Laver-Hunt  recorded  salience of the four major Portuguese parties 
on these eight issues (see, Laver and Hunt 1992, 286-91). The most salient issue for all major 
parties is public ownership of the means of production, which Laver and Hunt report to be the 
most indicative of the Left-Right dimension. Companion to Table 3 is Figure 4, showing that to 
whatever extent other issues are salient, the Laver-Hunt experts see the major Portuguese parties 
as holding different pro-con positions but lining up in essentially the same Left-Right order from 
one issue area to the next.  Looking at the party positions assigned by the experts, one’s first 
impression is that there is a general Left-Right dimension, covering economic and social issues, 
and a second centralisation/decentralisation dimension. There is a seeming distinctiveness of a 
second dimension due to the outlying position of the PCP on the issue of centralisation and 
decentralisation. Indeed, Laver and Hunt (1992, 53) themselves speak of a singular dimension on 
which all of the issues, except for centralization/decentralization, load heavily.  
Centralisation/decentralisation is the only issue loading on a second dimension. 
[Table 3 and Figure 1 about here] 
Although there appears to be a second dimension, it must be interpreted with caution. 
This is because centralisation/decentralisation is much more a matter of the means of organizing 
political advocacy within the Portuguese context than a goal in and of itself.  In advanced 
industrial societies, the Left tends to advocate centralized decision-making and improving the 
quality of life in the environment and of the workers congregating in cities. However, 
centralisation in the Portuguese mindset has instrumental value; it is not an ideological goal.  
Centralisation makes it easier to organize a planned economy and minimize the risk that localized 
political jurisdictions will variously define and distribute public sector goods and services with 
the effect that the scope of public goods is more narrow than it would be were they defined by 
one decisionmaker for an entire nation (Schattschneider 1960). In Portugal, with its experience of 
dictatorial rule and totally centralized government, a sizable agricultural sector, and a huge 
maldistribution of landholdings in rural areas, the political Left sees the instrumental value of 
centralisation differently.  On the far-Left, the groupings of identified Communist factions, 
including the Greens (PEV), are divided on the question of centralisation (Laver and Hunt 1992, 
289).   Near the Left-Centre of the spectrum, the PS has mixed motives.  Centralisation helps the 
PS desires to pursue a planned economy. But to avoid the risk of totalitarian rule, the PS favours 
distributing decision-making.  As Silvia Mendes (2000) explains, when the decentralisation 
question took centre-stage in the form of a 1998 referendum asking whether there should be 
  
  
devolution of political authority to regional units, it was not easy to discern where the Socialists 
stood.  This was despite the PS’s seemingly commitment to devolution as foreshadowed by the 
1976 Constitution.  In 1998, no party seems to have articulated a commanding and appealing 
principle for or against devolution.  The debate seems to have been gone in the direction of 
technical and ancillary matters—e.g., the public finance expense of decentralisation, what it 
meant to Portugal’s position in the EU, and the predictability how it might rearrange political 
competition.  
By overlaying a single line across the party positions (i.e., dimensional line drawn at 
about a 45° angle, that Laver and Hunt refer to as the underlying Left-Right dimension), we see  
that there is only one dimension (see Figure 1). 
Given the single-dimension of Portuguese politics, as seen through the lens of experts 
viewing the major parties, across the board, issue by issue, the PCP is furthest Left and the PP is 
furthest Right.3  In between, the PS is located at a Centre-Left position and the PSD at a Centre-
Right position in conformity with Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
  The consequence is that the issue space as organised by the Portuguese major parties 
appears to form one dimension.  Whether the issue involves the ownership of the means of 
production, taxation and service allocations by the state, foreign relations, state control over 
social and religious aspects of life, or others, we find the parties arrange themselves along a one-




  It might be said, half in jest and half-seriously, that political parties provide an answer to 
the question of whether falling trees make a sound in the forest when no one is around.  Parties 
and their would-be vote supporters ask whether policy advocacy has any meaning if none or few 
of its candidates find their way to parliament.  For this reason, even if policy is its foremost 
concern, a party that is continually disadvantaged by the rules translating votes into seats faces an 
uphill battle to keep its voters in subsequent elections and to serve the office-holding ambitions of 
its politically active members.  In turn, it follows, disproportionately high seat returns for large 
                                                     
3 A convenient way to gain a visual image of the single dimension is to have the mind’s eye draw a line 
from any party issue position to the illustrated dimension so that the imaginary line comes to the illustrated 
dimension at a 90° angle.  We have drawn one such imaginary line from the PCP’s position on 
decentralisation.  It should be obvious that, for example, all the PCP issue positions are furthest Left along 
the illustrated dimension. 
  
  
parties and, concomitantly, disproportionately low seat returns for small parties encourage the 
party system to contract in number.  Such is the case in Portugal. 
 A review of the numbers in Table 1 shows that anytime a party received more than 20% 
of the vote—and this occurred with the PS and PSD or their alliances—the party received a seat-
versus-vote bonus.  Taking a party’s seat percentage and subtracting from the party’s vote 
percentage shows that Portuguese parties with small to moderate vote shares have suffered seat-
versus-vote deficits between –0.1 and –2.8. The PSD and PS, on the other hand, have received 
seat-versus-vote bonuses between 1 and 8 percent. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the advantages and disadvantages correspond to the variability in 
the vote levels.  The figure helps to illustrate two forms of electoral advantage.  First, it marks the 
breakeven point for votes and seats somewhere near the vicinity of 20% of the vote.  Parties 
winning votes above the 20% mark receive a seat bonus; those below that mark suffer a seat 
deficit.  Relatively speaking, this is a very high breakeven point for a PR system.  A breakeven 
score of 20 is below that of Anglo-American single-member district plurality systems (31 to 
47%), but compared to other Western European PR systems during the 20th century, only the 
French system in 1945-46 had a breakeven point as high as 20 (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 90-
1).  Almost surely this puts pressure on small and medium-sized parties to coalesce as well as on 
voters to focus their attention on the two largest parties.  The second electoral advantage only  
involves the two major parties.  There is a general tendency for the PSD large-party seat bonus to 
exceed the seat bonus going to the PS.  On average, across all the 10 elections, the PSD seat 
bonus is +4.4 while the PS seat bonus is +2.8.  We believe this has something to do with the 
degree of the disproportionality because the higher the vote percentage, the larger the seat bonus 
more so for the PS as shown in the slope comparison.  The PSD average vote is 37.7% compared 
to the PS average of 33.5%.  However, as shown in Figure 4, even after taking the vote 
percentage differences into account, by overlaying a least squares line on seat advantages in 
relationship to the vote percentages, there is a general tendency for the PSD to receive a larger 
seat bonus than the PS—this is a bias in favour of the PSD. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 In addition to what the disproportionality of the system suggests about the pressures that 
reduce the effective number of parties, it raises a question about the operation of the electoral 
rules.  How could a seemingly reasonable and fair set of rules—an assembly of 230 members, 
elected under d’Hondt rules in 20 districts with no legal threshold—be associated with such a 
high breakeven point and with a general tendency to reward the PSD more so than the PS?  The 






Two types of electoral bias can arise under most electoral systems.  One is the result of 
the way a system creates differential voter weights due to either malapportionment in seat 
allocations or to differential turnout rates.  The other comes from the electoral formula used to 
allocate seats on the basis of votes within districts. In Portugal, this formula is the d’Hondt rule.   
 Rotten boroughs and rules favouring rural over urban areas are legendary in SMD 
systems, as in the UK during the 19th century and U.S. into the 1960s, but malapportionment 
systems can exist in PR systems as well.  As a hypothetical example of malapportionment under 
PR rules in Portugal, imagine that the Lisboa district deserves, on the basis of its number of 
eligible voters, 60 seats, but that the apportionment allocates only 50 seats.  A party that receives 
its highest vote percentage in this district will win fewer seats than its nationwide percentage of 
the vote would require because the votes in this district are undervalued.  Votes would be 
weighted as 5/6ths of their fair value.  Malapportionment is a structural problem.  The same 
consequence can arise for behavioural reasons associated with turnout differentials across 
districts.  On this score, imagine two fairly apportioned districts, each with 10 seats and 1000 
eligible voters.  In District #1, only 100 votes are cast with the parties’ votes distributed as A = 
70, B = 20, and C = 10.  In District #2, all the eligible voters cast a ballot, and the party votes are 
A = 300, B = 500, and C = 200.  Under a fair allocation, by district, party A will win 50% of the 
seats (seven from District #1 and three from District #2) with only 33.6% of the vote (370/1100). 
The 226 seats for resident citizens are apportioned to the 20 electoral districts, 18 
contiguous geographical areas on the continent and one district each for the autonomous island 
regions of the Açores and Madeira.  The district boundaries are set by statute.  The voter 
registration on which the apportionment is based is compulsory and permanent (Article 113).  As 
suggested in our discussion of voter turnout, the registration system makes one wonder whether 
there may not be some form of political maneuvering for partisan gain when it comes to getting 
and keeping voters’ names on the rolls.  In turn, basing the apportionment of seats on registration 
makes one wonder whether electoral bias due to malapportionment may have crept into the 
system. 
Table 4 reports population and registered voters counts, as well as for  each of the each of 
the 20 electoral districts.  For the 1991 election, the time of the most recent available official 
census of population.  We can compare the third column of numbers, the actual seat 
apportionment, to two precisely calculated theoretical apportionment values.  The first 
  
  
comparison is to what a hypothetically precise apportionment based on population, rather than on 
registered voters, would yield.  Recognizing that any precise apportionment is impossible because 
seats are allocated in whole numbers while precise calculations include fractions, we see that only 
five of the 20 districts have actual apportionments that differ by more than rounding (i.e., + 0.5).  
These include the four of the five largest districts—Aveiro, Braga, Lisboa, and Porto—plus the 
Madeira islands district.  Aveiro, Braga, Porto, and Madeira are slightly undervalued; Lisboa is 
noticeably overvalued with seats 3.16 above what its population size alone would indicate.  The 
second comparison makes it clear that the slight under and overvaluing in certain districts, with 
respect to population size, is due in part to registration differentials.  Comparably speaking, 
Aveiro, Braga, and Porto are slightly undervalued because their populations are low relative to 
the individuals registered.  Indeed, in the case of Porto, the 1.4 seat undervaluing with respect to 
population becomes a 1.18 seat overvaluing when it comes to registered voters.  It appears that, 
by and large, using of registration as compared to population may take away from the larger 
districts is in the end restored by an apportionment formula that provides a slight advantage to 
large districts.  Notice that the two largest districts, Lisboa and Porto, each have seat allocation 
that is more than 0.5 above what the precise registration-based apportionment would yield.  On 
the basis of these numbers, we must conclude that it is difficult to see how any sort of systematic 
malappotionment bias in favour of one party or the other exists in the Portuguese electoral 
system. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Could there be some form of interrelationship among apportionment, voter turnout, and 
the distribution of party votes that come together to favour the larger parties relative to the 
medium-sized and small parties and to benefit the PSD relative to the PS?  The evidence that 
responds to that question is a resounding no.  Students of SMD elections since the time of Francis 
Edgeworth’s initial foray into investigating electoral bias (Edgeworth 1898, 536) have shown that 
the total vote-weight bias, which combines biases due to malapportionment with those due to 
turnout, can be calculated by means of simple arithmetic (Butler 1947, pp. 284-85).  The 
nationwide vote percentage for a party is implicitly calculated with each voter given an equal 
weight.  The calculation of an average vote percentage for a party across a set of districts with 
weights set according to the number of seats, means that any difference between the nationwide 
percentage and the weighted average percentage records the difference between fair vote weights 
and vote weights that they are affected by malapportionment differentials, turnout differentials, or 
both.  These calculations for Portugal’s 1991 election show that the difference is never more than 
nine one-hundredths of one percent (0.09%).  By way of contrast, in the United States this 
  
  
calculation can be shown to have been as large as 3 and 4% (Campbell 1996).  In short, there is 
nothing in either the apportionment or the turnout rates across districts that would appear to 
produce a degree of partisan bias worth mentioning. 
Of course, the high breakeven point, the advantages for the larger parties in general, and 
the advantage to the PSD over the PS are still unaccounted for.  Given that it is not due to 
electoral biases associated with malapportionment or turnout, it almost certainly must be due to 
favouritism toward the large parties that arise from the seat allocation formula itself. 
The d’Hondt formula for allocating seats based on vote percentages has a well-known 
tendency to favour parties that win large vote percentages.  How much a large party is favoured 
depends on district magnitude so that the larger the magnitude, the smaller the favouritism.  As a 
general tendency, Portugal’s 11.5 effective district magnitude or 11.3 if we only consider the 226 
seats allocated from the residential vote (#of seats / #of districts) should produce seat allocations 
with reasonable proportionate accuracy, or so it would seem.  To say that Portugal’s district 
magnitude is 11.5 is to use an average value to describe the system overall.  As with so many 
descriptions based on an average value, there can be distortions in what the average actually tells 
us about reality.  Table 3 showed that the Portugal’s average district magnitude is a central 
tendency based on a highly skewed distribution.  To see this,  let us consider the median district 
magnitude. While the average is 11.5, the median district magnitude is seven.  Only 10 out of 20 
districts win seats ranging from three to six.  The other half have seats ranging from eight to 50 
seats, with two of these being outliers on the very high end, Lisboa with its 49 seats and Porto 
with 37.   
From the literature developed by Rokkan (1968) through Rae, Hanby, and Loosemore 
(1971) and Lijphart and Gibberd (1977), it can and has been shown that under the d’Hondt 
formula a party could win as much as 25% of the vote in a three-seat district and never actually 
win a single seat.  Generally, to be certain of winning a seat a party’s vote percentage must 
exceed (100 x [1 / M + 1]), where M is the district magnitude.  In three, four, five, and six seat 
districts, therefore, a party would have to exceed, respectively, 25, 20, 16.7, and 14.2 percent of 
the vote to guarantee itself one seat.  In Portugal, therefore, a small party can guarantee itself a 
seat from the Lisboa district with about 2% of the vote.  In half of the districts, the vote 
percentage must be much higher. In those districts with three to six seats, a party’s vote 
percentage will need to be higher than 25%, with three seats and higher than 14.2%, with six 
seats. 
In stricter terms, whether a party actually has to reach those vote levels to win a seat 
within a district depends on the vote distribution across all of the parties and not just a single 
  
  
party.  To see how allocations might work, we can take an example similar to what we might 
actually see in Portugal, with five parties, A-E in the table below, receiving vote percentages of 
39, 31, 12, 9, and 8.  The numbers in the left-hand column give the d’Hondt divisor, from 1 to 5, 
and the numbers to the right of the divisions (in bold) give the rank order priority for receiving a 
seat. 
Hypothetical Example of Party Vote Percentage in a Distict 
   (seat allocation priority number in bold next to the dividend) 
             Party          A                   B                     C                    D                    E 
  39%               31%                12%                9%                  8% 
     d’Hondt 
     Divisor 
          1   39.00   1        31.00   2        12.00   6          9.00    9          8.00   10 
          2   19.50   3        15.50   4          6.00   -           4.50    -           4.00    - 
          3   13.00   5        10.33   7          4.00   -           3.00    -           2.67    - 
          4     9.75   8          7.75   -           3.00   -           2.25    -           2.00    - 
          5     7.80   -           6.20   -           2.40   -           1.80    -           1.60    - 
 Under the given vote percentages, the two largest parties win the first five seats.  Thus, in 
a district with three, four, or five seats, the two large parties win 100% of the seats with 70 
percent of the vote.  Even in an eight-seat district, the two largest parties win seven out of eight 
seats, i.e., 87.5% of the seats with 70% of the vote.  Notice, also, that generally but not always the 
single largest party enjoys the single largest advantage.  These two tendencies of the d’Hondt 
formula are important elements when it comes to explaining Portugal’s high breakeven point, 
favouritism toward large parties, and in particular toward the PSD compared to the PS in the 
small districts. In other words, in Portugal’s 10 districts with a small number of seats, even the 
medium-sized parties such as the Communists have found it difficult to win a seat.  For that 
reason alone, both the PSD and PS enjoy an advantage over the smaller parties, and as the single 
largest party in the small districts most of the time the PSD enjoys the single largest advantage.  
To see how these effects arise, we need to turn to the seats won by the parties in each district. 
Table 5 shows the number of seats, the party vote percentages, and the number of seats 
won in each of the 20 electoral districts for the 1999 Assembly election.  The first thing to notice 
is that only in districts with 10 or more seats did a party win a seat with less than 10% of the vote.  
Furthermore, the most disproportionate within-district results arise in the small districts, and the 
most directly proportionate results for the leading party in a district emerged in the largest 
districts.  On the small-district side,  Beja with three seats saw the PS win 67% of the seats (two 
  
  
of three) with 46.7% of the vote, and in Portalegre with three seats, the PS won 67% of the seats 
(two of three) with 51.3% of the vote.  On the large-district side, in Lisboa, the PS won 46.9% of 
the seats (23 of 49) with 42.6% of the vote; in Porto the PS won 51.4% of the seats (19 of 37) 
with 48.0% of the vote. 
[Table 5 about here] 
The message that is loud and clear here is that are that in all districts, regardless of district 
magnitude, the leading party enjoys a seat-to-vote advantage. And the smaller the district, the 
larger, generally, is that advantage, unless their regional base warrants substantial electoral effort 
For instance, the Communists are discouraged in small districts, except in the Alentejo districts of 
Beja and Évora.  The two large parties tend to enjoy highest vote support in districts with fewer 
than seven seats.4  To the PS and the PSD relative appeal in small districts, the d’Hondt formula 
adds a bonus.  
Finally, though a strong inference would require more detailed analysis, the election 
results in Table 9 offer a strong suggestion that the small advantage over the PS comes from how 
the PSD’s relatively low vote support in Lisboa, Portalegre, and Setúbal.   These three 
districts had, in 1999, 50, 19, and 17 seats, respectively.  Other than districts in the Communist 
strongholds in the Alentejo, Lisboa, Portalegre, and Setúbal are the two districts where the PSD 
does relatively poorly.  The PS, on the other hand, performs at or about its nationwide average in 
these three districts.  Because the d’Hondt formula inflicts disadvantages to medium-sized parties 
in large districts, the PSD disadvantage for poor performance in a district is attenuated.  And, 
even though the PSD-to-PS advantage is small, if the PS held the advantage, it would almost 
surely have won a clear majority of the seats in 1999, instead of the exact 50% (115 seats) they 
did win.  That is, if the Lisboa area were divided into 10 five-seat districts, the PS almost surely 
would have had a parliamentary majority.  Alternatively, if Viana do Castelo, Vila Real, Viseu, 
the Açores, and Madeira formed one combined district of 30 seats, the PS would likely hold a 
majority. 
The development of the Portuguese party system during the nation’s 25-plus years of 
Democracia shows us something on the order of a two-and-a-half to three party system.  Each of 
three elements—a presidential office with real powers, legislative electoral rules, and a seemingly 
unidimensional issue space—tend to push the party system toward fewer rather than more parties.  
Under the political developments in the light of the push from presidential politics is it likely that 
                                                     
4 The 1999 PS and PSD combined nationwide vote amounted to 76.3% of the total.  With the PSD doing 
especially poorly in Alentejo districts, the combined percentages of the two major parties is lower.  
Otherwise, in Viana do Castelo they won an average 76.0%, and in the other six small districts they won 
more than 80%. 
  
  
the system may go even further toward a two-party model?  Today, that looks unlikely.  The 
ideological distances between the parties, especially the Communists and the PS, appear too large 
to allow a merger except for the temporary electoral convenience at the time of the majoritarian 
presidential contests.  The rules for electing the Assembly of the Republic—as long as there exist 
a few large districts, the Alentejo geographic Communist base, or both—provide real 
opportunities for the Communists.  For one thing, the party can retain its distinctive voice through 
the legislative elections and in the Assembly of the Republic itself.  Also, Communist leaders will 
be able to retain their positions of power, in the party organisation and in the Assembly.  Having 
the Communists stand on their on also saves the PS the effort of devising a strategy for trying to 
figure out how to structure a ballot that balances their politicians with politicians who, but for 
electoral disincentives, would prefer to stand for election as Communists.  The long-run fate of 
parties that have been standing to the right of the PSD is not so clear.  They do not appear to have 
any particularly strong regional base, similar to the Alentejo for the Communists.  And, after 
1976, their electoral size has never been so large as to lead anyone to believe that they can mount 
and sustain electoral efforts that will do much to put power in the hands of their leaders.  We can 
well imagine that ambitious politicians on the Right will be able to find leadership positions 
within the PSD, reasonably congenial to their ideological leanings. This is the reason for the AD 
having recently resurfaced, died, and is a possibility.  
We have at this juncture, therefore, a vision of a Portuguese party system that lines up 
Right to Left with one major Right-leaning party, one major Left-of-Centre party, and a medium-
sized party somewhat on the distant Left in the Portuguese policy space.  Given, on the one hand, 
that it is the distance along the Left-Right spectrum that would seem to provide the motivation for 
the system not to contact to a two-party system and, on the other, that we are assuming there is  
no significant dimension other than Left-Right that might expand the system, we turn next to the 




This study tells a story of the Portuguese party system. Throughout this paper, we have 
argued and effectively shown evidence pointing to the forces contributing to this compression 
tendency: the characteristics of the electoral system—particularly the nature of the presidential 
powers, the vote-to-seat-translation rule, d´Hondt, and the geographics and size of the electoral 
districts. These features of the Portuguese society and party system are not likely to change, at 
least not in the near future. That means that one can expect the tendency for Portugal to have a 
  
  
small number of effective parties is likely to continue. And this has important implications for 
those smaller parties that have up until now been able to compete, and wish to continue 
competing for a few seats in parliament, with the two largest Centrist parties, the PS and the PSD. 
In the Portuguese case, these smaller parties are the PCP and the PP.  
  
  
Table 1: Vote and Seat Legislative Election Results by Party, 1975-99 
 
                                                          Party Percentages 
                    Effective 
       Left    APU/CDU                                         AD       Right        Number  
Election    Faction       MDP         PCP            PS            PSD         CDS/PP     Faction     of Parties 
 
1975 
Vote%          0.8            4.4            13.5            40.7         28.3            8.2                3.66 
Seat%           0.4            2.0            12.0            46.4         32.4            6.4             2.95 
 
1976 
Vote%          1.8            ----           15.3            36.7          25.2          16.7           4.00 
Seat%           0.4            ----           15.2            40.7          27.8          16.0                    3.43  
 
1979 
Vote%          2.8                   19.5                    28.2                     46.3                     3.00 
Seat%           0.4                   18.8                    29.6                     51.2       2.60 
 
1980  
Vote%          2.4                   17.3                    28.7                     48.3                     2.89 
Seat%           0.4                   16.4                    29.6                     53.6               2.49 
 
1983 
Vote%         0.7                   18.7                    37.3           27.8            12.7                    3.73 
Seat%          0.0                   17.2                    40.4           30.0            12.0       3.36 
 
1985  
Vote%         20.4                  16.0                    21.4           30.6           10.0                4.78 
Seat%          18.0                  15.2                    22.8           35.2             8.8                4.18 
 
1987  
Vote%         6.5                    12.5                    22.8           51.3             4.4                 2.98 
Seat%          2.8                    12.4                    24.0           59.2             1.6                    2.36 
 
1991  
Vote%         2.6                      9.0                    29.6           51.0             4.4           1.7     2.79 
Seat%          0.0                      7.4                    30.9           57.4             2.2           0.4     2.32 
 
1995    
Vote%         1.9                     8.7                     44.6            34.8            9.2                0.2     2.97 
Seat%          0.0                     6.5                     48.7            38.2            6.5  0.0     2.55 
 
1999 
Vote%          2.5                    9.2                    44.9             33.0           8.5                                  3.06 
Seat%           0.9                    7.4                    50.0             35.2           6.5                                  2.61 
 
Note: For the purpose of exposition, cell entries for the Left faction only include the following parties: UDP, PSR, PRD, 
PCTP/MRPP; the Right faction  refers to PSN.  
  
  
Table 2:  Presidential Election Results by Candidate, 1976-2001 
 
 
                   Effective 
                 Number of 
Year            Vote% Party Support  Candidate              Parties 
 
 
1976               61.5 PS + PSD + PP           António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes  2.31 
                       16.5 Independent           Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho 
          14.4 Independent           José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo 
            7.6 PCP            Octávio Pato 
 
 
1980               56.5    PS + PCP           António dos Santos Ramalho Eanes  2.12 
                39.0 PSD + PP            Francisco Sá Carneiro 
                         1.5 Independent           Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho 
            0.8  Independent           Carlos Galvão de Melo 
                         0.8  Independent           António Pires Veloso 
      0.2 POUS            António Aires Rodrigues 
 
 
1986    46.3 PSD           Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral   3.15 
  First   25.4 PS           Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares 
  Round   20.9 PRD + PCP          Francisco Salgado Zenha 
                  7.4 Independent          María de Lourdes Pintasilgo 
 
1986               51.3 PS + PCP          Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares  NA 
   Runoff         48.7 PP + PSD          Diogo Pinto Freitas do Amaral 
 
 
1991               70.4 PS + PSD          Mário Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares  1.87 
          14.1 PP           Basílio Aldolfo Mendonça Horta da França 
          12.9 PCP           Carlos Alberto do Vale Gomes Carvalhas 
            2.2 UDP           Carlos Manuel Marques da Silva 
       
 
1996               53.8 PS + PCP           Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio  1.99 
          47.2 PSD           Aníbal Cavaco Silva 
     
 
2001               55.8 PS            Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio  2.30 
          34.5 PSD           Joaquim Ferreira do Amaral 
            5.1 PCP           António Simões de Abreu 
            3.0 BE           Fernando Rosas 




Table 3: Salience and Positions on Eight Policy Issues of Major Portuguese Parties  
 
 PCP  PS  PSD  PP  
Issues Score Salience Score Salience Score Salience Score Salience
Increase in services vs. Cut in Taxes  3.43 12.86 8.75 11.63 14.00 12.40 17.00 15.00 
Pro-friendly relations vs. Anti-friendly with Former USSR 1.14 13.71 7.88 12.00 13.00 10.50 15.86 12.29 
Pro-Public Ownership vs. Anti-Public Ownership 1.14 18.86 9.50 14.00 13.83 15.00 18.14 16.86 
Pro-Permissive vs. Anti-Permissive Social Policy 2.67 16.43 8.00 14.38 12.40 13.17 18.17 12.14 
Anticlerical vs. Proclerical 2.71 4.83 9.63 7.57 13.50 8.40 19.29 16.67 
Pro-Urban Interests vs. Anti Urban Interests 7.00 10.83 8.29 10.43 10.80 9.20 16.50 13.17 
Pro-Decentralization vs. Centralization of Decisions 13.83 13.33 8.57 13.29 11.60 13.40 12.50 11.00 
Environment vs. Growth 5.83 13.17 9.86 11.00 12.60 10.80 13.83 7.67 
 
Note: These are the results of a survey of expert opinions on party positions conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 286-91) 
  
  























 1991 Precise 
Apportionment 
Regis. Basis 
Aveiro   667314   526727 14 15.19 14.30 
Beja   165261   152597   4   3.76   4.14 
Braga   776254   587337 16 17.67 15.95 
Bragança   155423   148876   4   3.54   4.04 
Castelo Branco   209948   199654   5   4.78   5.42 
      
Coimbra   425211   370925 10   9.68 10.07 
Évora   171143   149495   4   3.90   4.06 
Faro   339836   293573   8   7.74   7.97 
Guarda   184337   173630   4   4.20   4.71 
Leiria   427633   358145 10   9.73   9.73 
      
Lisboa 2057562 1796885 50 46.84 48.80 
Portalegre   130706   117052   3   2.98   3.18 
Porto 1686884 1319056 37 38.40 35.82 
Santarém   440006   385602 10 10.02 10.47 
Setúbal   719347   595534 16 16.38 16.17 
      
Viana do Castelo   242371  214800   6   5.52   5.83 
Vila Real   236594  213334   6   5.39   5.79 
Viseu   402273  344478   9   9.16   9.35 
Açores   239190  181018   5   5.44   4.92 
Madeira   250550  193763   5   5.70   5.26 
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I ssue Domains        PCP       PS       PSD                CDS/PP 
   A.  Services vs. Taxes       3.43       8.75      14.00      17.00 
   B.  Unfriendly with USSR       1.14       7.88      13.00      15.86 
   C.  Public vs. Private Ownership      1.14       9.50      13.83      18.14 
   D.  Restrictive Social Policy       2.67       8.00      12.40      18.17 
   E.  Anti- vs. Pro-clerical       2.71       9.63      13.50      19.29 
   F.  Urban vs. Rural Interests       7.00       8.29      10.80      16.50 
   G.  Centralize Decision Making            13.83       8.57      11.60      12.50 
   H.  Environment vs. Growth       5.83       9.86      16.60      13.83 
 
 
Source: Party positions are from a survey of experts conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 286-91).  High 
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Figure 3: Relationship between Seat Percentage versus Vote Percentage 











Seat vs. Vote 
 































* The seat percentage versus vote percentage advantage/disadvantage is calculated as (% of Seats 
- % of Votes).  A party with an advantage has a positive score because it has received a larger 
percentage of seats compared to votes; a party with a disadvantage has a negative score because it 
has received a smaller percentage of seats compared to votes. 
 
**The breakeven point is an eyeball estimate of the vote percentage level where a party can 
expect to have neither an advantage nor a disadvantage—i.e., to breakeven. 
 
*** The lines for the PSD and the PS show the respective least squares estimates of how their 
advantages increase as the level of their vote percentages increase.  The equations are: 
 
PSD Advantage  =  -1.39  +  .153 Vote%,      with R2 = .681;  se   =  1.06 
 
 
        (n = 10)            (1.32)    (.034) 
PS Advantage  =  -3.44  +  .186 Vote%,      with R2 = .755;  se   =  0.89 
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